



Interview Summary: Dennis Miller & Steve Madden (National Police Federation)

Dennis Miller and Steve Madden were interviewed by Frank Au, Mark Pritchard, Eric Brousseau, and Misha Boutilier on August 24, 2022. Questions about this summary should be directed to Frank Au.

Background

Dennis Miller and Steve Madden provided evidence based on their own knowledge and experience regarding the RCMP's jurisdiction and general approach to policing in the National Capital Region.

However, with respect to the Freedom Convoy protests in Ottawa and elsewhere in Canada, their direct role was limited to supporting the RCMP members who were being deployed, and liaising with RCMP senior management regarding the terms of those deployments. Mr. Miller and Mr. Madden were not directly involved in the RCMP's operational response to the protests, and much of the information described below was relayed to them by representatives of RCMP senior management or by members on the ground.

Policing and Labour Relations Experience of Mr. Miller and Mr. Madden

Dennis Miller is Vice President of the National Police Federation (**NPF**) and is currently on full-time release from his employment as a Royal Canadian Mounted Police (**RCMP**) officer. Mr. Miller joined RCMP in 1993. In 1994, he joined RCMP's J Division in New Brunswick, where he deployed as part of a tactical team on numerous occasions to respond to events such as protests, strikes, and fishery disputes between Indigenous communities and non-Indigenous fishers. Mr. Miller subsequently deployed to multiple major events such as G7, G8, G20, and APEC meetings, the Summit of the Americas, and the 2010 Vancouver/Whistler Olympics.

In 2014, Mr. Miller was seconded to RCMP's Staff Relations Representative Program, a RCMP member representative body staffed by elected representatives to advance members' workplace concerns. As a function of his role, and due to his experience with tactical units and major events, he assisted with reviewing the RCMP's response to Michael Zehaf-Bibeau's October 22, 2014 attack on Parliament Hill and was responsible for representing RCMP members' interests in that review. He helped prepare the Hazardous Occurrence Incident Report about the attack that evaluated the risks RCMP members faced, how RCMP members responded, and equipment required to secure Parliament Hill. Mr. Miller was a founding member of NPF in 2016 and was elected NPF Vice President in 2019.

During the January-February 2022 Freedom Convoy protests, Mr. Miller liaised with the Commanding Officer of RCMP's Ottawa-based National Division, Assistant Commissioner Ches Parsons, as well as the Director General of RCMP's National



Headquarters, Mario Panizzon. In his capacity as co-chair of NPF's collective bargaining committee, Mr. Miller also fielded questions from members about the collective agreement and addressed members in Ottawa before they were deployed.

Steve Madden is a NPF Board Director for the Atlantic/Central Region and is currently on full-time release from his employment as a RCMP officer. Mr. Madden joined RCMP's E Division in British Columbia in 2006 and worked in the Lower Mainland region. In 2011, Mr. Madden moved to Ottawa and worked for RCMP's Parliament Hill Protective Services unit. He subsequently worked in the Prime Minister's Protection Detail. He began to serve as a Member Workplace Advisor for RCMP's National Division and National Headquarters in 2018, and was elected to the NPF Board of directors in 2020.

[Background on the National Police Federation](#)

The NPF is the sole certified bargaining agent for regular members and reservists of RCMP below the rank of Inspector.

Mr. Miller explained that, after the Supreme Court of Canada concluded that the RCMP's internal labour relations structures were unconstitutional, he and a small group of other RCMP officers decided that RCMP officers needed to form an association to represent members going forward. They formed NPF, signed up thousands of RCMP members across Canada, and applied to the Federal Public Sector Labour Relations and Employment Board for accreditation in April 2017. In June 2019, the Board accredited NPF as the sole certified bargaining agent for all regular members and reservists of the RCMP across the country.

NPF subsequently negotiated a collective agreement with the Treasury Board Secretariat, which was signed and took effect on August 6, 2021.¹

[RCMP Jurisdiction to Enforce Provincial and Municipal Laws and Police Jurisdiction in the National Capital Region and Parliamentary Precinct](#)

[RCMP Jurisdiction to Enforce Provincial and Municipal Laws](#)

Mr. Miller explained that RCMP's authority to enforce provincial and municipal laws varies depending on the province in question. In all provinces and territories except for Ontario and Quebec, RCMP is the police of jurisdiction pursuant to policing contracts with those provinces and territories, and have authority to enforce federal, provincial, and municipal laws. In contrast, in Ontario and Quebec, the RCMP only have authority to enforce federal laws and regulations, and must be sworn in as provincial or municipal special constables to enforce provincial and municipal laws. As an example, Mr. Miller stated that if a RCMP officer in Ontario observed a driver running a red light, the officer could not intervene (for example, to enforce the provincial *Highway Traffic Act*, unless the officer determined that the driver was committing an offense under the *Criminal Code*).

¹ NAT00000036.



Police Jurisdiction in the National Capital Region

Mr. Miller also discussed RCMP's jurisdiction in the National Capital Region. He explained that RCMP is designated under the *Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act* and the *National Capital Act* as the police of jurisdiction for National Capital Commission (NCC) lands and can enforce provincial and municipal laws on those lands because the *National Capital Act* adopts those laws as federal laws. He further stated that RCMP would generally be the first police service to respond to any incidents requiring police intervention on Public Services and Procurement Canada properties in Ottawa, but that RCMP would typically then request that the local police of jurisdiction, the Ottawa Police Service (OPS), respond to the incident. He also stated that the RCMP have primary responsibility over terrorism incidents in the National Capital Region. In addition, he explained that the RCMP, through its Protective Operations units, is responsible for protecting the safety and security of designated Canadian officials, international dignitaries, and their residences, in the National Capital Region, including the Governor General, the Prime Minister, and Supreme Court of Canada justices.

Mr. Miller and Mr. Madden identified RCMP's lack of authority to enforce provincial and municipal laws as a barrier to using RCMP resources effectively to police protests in the National Capital Region. Mr. Miller mentioned that RCMP officers could only act if protestors were openly committing an offence under the *Criminal Code*, but would lack authority to act in the significantly more common circumstance of protestors committing provincial offences, such as under Ontario's *Highway Traffic Act*, or disobeying municipal orders or by-laws. He emphasized that it is not inherently criminal to protest. To the contrary, he explained that it can be very difficult to draw a clear line between a protestor exercising a constitutionally protected right of free expression and a protestor committing a *Criminal Code* offence. He expressed concern that RCMP members who were not sworn in as provincial or municipal special constables in Ontario would be exposed to risk if they arrested protestors who were clearly committing provincial and municipal offences but may not have been committing *Criminal Code* offences.

Mr. Miller explained that NCC conservation officers and OPS also play a role in the policing of NCC lands. He stated that NCC conservation officers are not trained to address law enforcement situations or engage with members of the public who are not compliant and would seek assistance from RCMP or OPS in either scenario. If RCMP made arrests on NCC lands, RCMP would bring arrested persons to OPS and process them at OPS with OPS's assistance pursuant to what Mr. Miller described as a "gentlemen's agreement" between RCMP and OPS.

Mr. Miller explained that, in the years before the Freedom Convoy arrived, RCMP had gradually been reducing its policing responsibilities in the National Capital Region and transferring those responsibilities to OPS and the Parliamentary Protective Service (PPS). He mentioned that RCMP formerly maintained 120 patrol officers in Ottawa to patrol areas surrounding embassies and NCC lands, but only had 60 patrol officers at the time of the Freedom Convoy. He also stated that the number of RCMP members at RCMP National Headquarters in Ottawa had shrunk from between 1600 to 1700, to only 1000 to 1100. He attributed this reduction to the strain on RCMP's federal policing footprint that



RCMP's contract policing responsibilities caused, as well as to an internal re-evaluation of RCMP's federal policing role.

Police Jurisdiction in the Parliamentary Precinct

Mr. Miller also discussed police jurisdiction over the Parliamentary Precinct. He stated that until 2014, three agencies were responsible for security at Parliament Hill: RCMP, the House of Commons Security Service, and Senate Protective Services. RCMP policed the Parliament Hill grounds outside the walls of Centre Block, the House of Commons Security Service managed security for the House of Commons portion of Centre Block, the Senate Protective Services managed security for the Senate portion of Centre Block. Mr. Miller explained that the House of Commons Security Services and Senate Protective Services were not trained to fill any role beyond serving as security guards and were subject to political influence by the Speaker of the House of Commons and the Speaker of the Senate, to whom, respectively, each service reported.

On October 22, 2014, Michael Zehaf-Bibeau fatally shot Corporal Nathan Cirillo at the National War Memorial and then charged into Parliament and continued shooting until he was incapacitated. Mr. Miller provided expert advice and assistance during the incident to the commanding officer of RCMP's National Division and helped prepare the hazardous incident report. Mr. Miller stated that the attack exposed the limited training of the House of Commons Security Service and the Senate Protective Services relative to RCMP, as well as the challenge of effective policing where there is divided jurisdiction. Mr. Miller stated that RCMP considered attempting to take over security and policing on Parliament Hill following the attack as a result. He explained that RCMP quickly abandoned this idea for a number of reasons, including a re-evaluation of RCMP's federal policing functions, political pressures, and complex jurisdictional boundaries of policing in the National Capital Region. Instead, a decision was made to ramp down RCMP's role by handing off RCMP's responsibility to police the grounds of Parliament Hill to PPS. In 2015, the House of Commons Security Service and the Senate Protective Services were amalgamated to form PPS, which was granted exclusive jurisdiction over the grounds and buildings on Parliament Hill. A RCMP member was assigned to head PPS, and RCMP provided limited training to PPS members.

RCMP Response to Protests in Ottawa

Pre-Arrival Planning and Intelligence & RCMP Initial Role

Mr. Miller explained that, as the police of jurisdiction in western Canada, RCMP monitored and gathered intelligence on the Freedom Convoy as it proceeded from British Columbia across the country. He stated that, once the convoy crossed the Manitoba-Ontario border, the Ontario Provincial Police (**OPP**) became the police of jurisdiction until the convoy arrived in Ottawa, at which point OPS became the police of jurisdiction. He stated that, after the Freedom Convoy arrived in Ontario, the RCMP relinquished the lead role and handed primary responsibility to the OPP and, thereafter, the OPS. However, in partnership with those other police agencies, the RCMP continued to monitor the Convoy, albeit with reduced intensity, and with a focus on intelligence relevant to the RCMP's



protective policing role in Ottawa. The RCMP remained police of jurisdiction with primary intelligence gathering responsibility regarding the Convoy protests in Western Canada.

Mr. Madden explained that when the Freedom Convoy arrived in Ottawa, RCMP's primary role was to ensure the safety and security of designated Canadian officials, international dignitaries, and related properties in the National Capital Region. RCMP's Protective Operations Response Unit, headed by Acting Chief Superintendent Mitch Monette, was responsible for this protective services mandate. Mr. Madden explained that Acting Chief Superintendent Monette had considerable experience planning major events and would have prepared contingency plans in case an event of concern occurred.

Mr. Miller explained the role of the National Capital Region Command Centre (**NCRCC**) in the initial response to the Freedom Convoy. NCRCC is a RCMP facility built in the late 1990s to serve as an information hub and command centre to coordinate major events that involve multiple police forces and partner agencies. Each police force or partner agency participating in a major event appoints a representative to attend the NCRCC. Mr. Miller stated that, while NCRCC had multi-agency representation, a single agency was always in gold-level command, the most senior level of command under the RCMP's gold-silver-bronze command structure. For previous major events, such as Canada Day 2017, RCMP assumed gold-level command at NCRCC. Mr. Miller stated that OPS assumed gold-level command role at NCRCC for the operational response to Freedom Convoy, but observed that OPS had previously been in gold command at NCRCC only for more minor events.

Based on their experience, Mr. Miller and Mr. Madden identified concerns with allowing Freedom Convoy trucks into the downtown core and permitting them to park near the Parliamentary Precinct. Mr. Madden observed that placing heavy fuel trucks near Parliament Hill posed an unacceptable risk because of the potential for those trucks to explode, whether by accident or design. Mr. Miller agreed and mentioned that by allowing the trucks into the downtown core, Freedom Convoy protestors were able to entrench themselves there. He suggested that, relative to the RCMP, the OPS did not have the same level of resources, capacity, or experience in policing large-scale protest events. Mr. Miller stated that he had policed three previous G20 summits where RCMP directed protestors to park at a distance from the summit location and then arranged for buses to transport protestors from the parking location to the protest site. He explained that if RCMP was the lead agency for the operational response to the Freedom Convoy, it would have arranged truck parking spaces outside of the downtown core, arranged for busing to and from the downtown core protest site, communicated these arrangements to protestors in advance of their arrival, and been prepared to take enforcement action against any protestors who attempted to drive their vehicles into the downtown core.

Declaration of Emergency under the NPF Collective Agreement

The Freedom Convoy arrived in Ottawa on January 28 and 29. On January 30, Assistant Commissioner Parsons declared an emergency on behalf of National Division under the August 6, 2021 collective agreement between NPF and the Treasury Board Secretariat. Mr. Miller explained that any RCMP divisional commander can declare an emergency



under the collective agreement. If an emergency is declared, the collective agreement authorizes RCMP to redeploy members and temporarily waive scheduling and maximum work hours provisions of the collective agreement to ensure public safety and delivery of policing services.²

Mr. Miller stated that Assistant Commissioner Parsons consulted him before declaring the emergency to discuss the consequences of the declaration and the additional scheduling powers it would grant National Division. Mr. Miller's understanding was that Assistant Commissioner Parsons decided to declare an emergency because he had exhausted RCMP assets and resources based in the National Division. Mr. Miller informed Assistant Commissioner Parsons that, if he needed to obtain RCMP resources from other RCMP divisions during the emergency, he should contact National Headquarters, under the command of Commissioner Brenda Lucki, and seek her authorization to contact those divisions and request resources. During the interview, Mr. Miller explained that the declared emergency was limited to the National Capital Region, and that RCMP resources would only become subject to the emergency provisions of the collective agreement upon deployment to that region.

On January 30, Mr. Miller also discussed the consequences of the emergency declaration with the Director General of RCMP's National Headquarters, Mario Panizzon. He stated that, unlike Assistant Commissioner Parsons, Mr. Panizzon was a civilian member of RCMP and had a limited understanding of operational processes.

OPS Requests for Additional RCMP Resources & RCMP Response

Mr. Miller and Mr. Madden described their understanding of the general approach to the sharing of RCMP resources with other police agencies in Ontario. Typically, a municipal police service such as OPS should first request additional resources from OPP, and only turn to the RCMP (which does not have inherent jurisdiction or authority in Ontario) if OPP and other Ontario police forces were unable to supply those resources.

During the Freedom Convoy protests, Mr. Miller stated that OPS first requested 150 to 200 RCMP resources to assist with managing Highway 417 off-ramp closures on February 2. Mr. Miller understood that RCMP initially declined the request because its members did not have jurisdiction or authority to police Ontario highways. It directed OPS to seek assistance from OPP first. The OPP informed RCMP that it was unable to supply resources as quickly as OPS required, at which point the RCMP supplied the 150 members requested by OPS. These RCMP officers were sworn in as special OPS constables by February 4 so that they could enforce provincial and municipal laws. Mr. Madden explained that the RCMP and OPS employed a split command system for these members. Under that system, the members were deployed separately from OPS under the direct command of an RCMP officer, but OPS chose where to deploy them and the RCMP officer commanding them reported to the OPS-commanded NCRCC. Mr. Madden

² NAT00000036 at ss. 2.01, 21.20.



stated that RCMP employed this split command system because RCMP members were accustomed to using RCMP's command structure and communications.

Mr. Miller discussed RCMP's response to additional OPS resource requests. He stated that OPS requested 1600 officers from RCMP shortly after RCMP supplied 150 officers on February 4. He understood that OPS wanted to replace its officers in the downtown core with RCMP officers and place those RCMP officers under OPS command. He described his understanding that OPS's request resulted in an OPS-RCMP meeting; neither Mr. Miller nor Mr. Madden attended the meeting. Mr. Miller was advised that during the meeting OPS representatives compared the Freedom Convoy to a terrorist attack at Parliament Hill and argued that RCMP should be the lead policing agency because protestors were protesting federal government policies. RCMP representatives attending the meeting disagreed and stated that OPS was responsible for policing the Freedom Convoy because OPS was the police of jurisdiction in the protest site.

RCMP Build-Up in the National Capital Region

In response to OPS's request, RCMP began to deploy additional members to Ottawa. RCMP increased its number of members assisting to OPS from 150 to 600, then to 800, and later to 1600. All these officers arrived by approximately February 12 and were sworn in as OPS special constables. Mr. Miller stated that RCMP deployed so many members because the OPP was unable to meet the OPS's resource requests.

Mr. Miller explained that RCMP resources arrived in Ottawa from every Canadian province. He stated that many specialized RCMP teams arrived, including police dog services, tactical and public order units, emergency response teams, negotiators and members experienced with protests, and crowd monitoring teams. He stated that RCMP divisional commanders released these resources if they were available. He explained that it took approximately 4-5 days to deploy and arrange the logistics for the additional officers.

Mr. Miller and Mr. Madden attributed RCMP's ability to rapidly build up resources in the National Capital Region to RCMP's size and streamlined process for resource requests. Mr. Miller stated that RCMP could redeploy significant numbers of members to Ottawa because it has 20,000 officers — significantly in excess of the available capacity of both the OPP and the OPS. Mr. Madden mentioned that RCMP's numerical strength gave it significant surge capacity. Mr. Miller explained that RCMP's typical process for resource requests was straightforward: any divisional commander could request reinforcements either from another division directly or, where extensive resources are required, from National Headquarters, under the command of the Commissioner, who in turn would liaise with other divisional commanders across the country and determine which resources to assign to the division in need.

However, Mr. Miller and Mr. Madden offered their opinion that the need to consult and work with politicians and multiple police agencies delayed the deployment of RCMP resources in Ottawa. They explained that the involvement of the RCMP, OPS, OPP, and various political actors and organizations, all with different priorities and processes, and



without any clear understanding of who was in charge, added complexity and, in some cases, friction, which delayed the implementation of the RCMP resources required to respond to the Convoy protests in Ottawa.

Assumption of Gold Command, Enforcement Operation, and Drawdown

Mr. Miller and Mr. Madden stated that RCMP assumed gold command of the police response to the Freedom Convoy from OPS on February 14. Mr. Miller attributed RCMP's assumption of gold command to the fact that RCMP had the most resources on the ground, and had the most experience and knowledge at managing large-scale events and protests, relative to OPP or OPS.

Mr. Madden stated that, after RCMP increased its footprint to 1600 members and assumed gold command, a strategic plan was developed and deployed, with the involvement of all three responding police agencies. Public order units moved into the downtown core and cleared out the protestors. This operation lasted approximately 72 hours and was completed by February 20. He stated that RCMP kept hundreds of officers on shift for 96 hours after the operation concluded, and then slowly began to draw down its forces. Mr. Miller explained that as the RCMP drawdown progressed, it transferred policing authority back to the Ontario agencies.

RCMP Response to the Ambassador Bridge Blockade

Mr. Miller explained that RCMP played a supporting role to OPP and the Windsor Police Service (**WPS**) in the response to the blockade of the Ambassador Bridge. He noted that WPS requested tactical officers from OPP, and that OPP supplied some and asked RCMP to supply additional tactical officers. RCMP agreed to OPP's request and deployed a tactical unit from Ottawa to Windsor that was used as a reserve tactical unit during the clearing of the blockade. Mr. Miller observed that RCMP was not in command in Windsor, and that the RCMP unit returned to Ottawa after the blockade was cleared.

Mr. Miller also commented on the division of police resources in Windsor. He stated that RCMP is responsible for border integrity, including by assisting and reinforcing Canada Border Services Agency officers at the Canada-U.S. border. However, he explained that in Ontario, RCMP only possess jurisdiction over the area 50 meters away from the border, and that jurisdiction beyond that point falls to OPP or the local police of jurisdiction.

RCMP Response to Blockades at Western Ports of Entry³

Overall Assessment of RCMP Response to Blockades at Western Ports of Entry

Mr. Miller and Mr. Madden characterized RCMP's response to blockades at Emerson, Coutts, and the Pacific Highway as successful and attributed that success to RCMP's

³ Mr. Miller and Mr. Madden stated that their knowledge of RCMP's response to Emerson, Coutts, and the Pacific Highway blockades was based on information received from NPF Board Directors. Prairie Region Board Director Bobby Baker provided information on RCMP's response to the Emerson blockade, Prairie Region Board Director Kevin Halwa provided information on RCMP's response to the Coutts blockade, and



principal role as the police of jurisdiction and use of liaison teams. Mr. Miller explained that RCMP was the sole police agency in charge of the response to each blockade and was able to quickly marshal additional RCMP resources and resolve the blockade. The RCMP also had significant additional resources on standby, which could be deployed very quickly, should the circumstances require. Mr. Miller and Mr. Madden noted that RCMP Divisional Liaison Team (DLT) officers, who are full-time protest specialists, deployed to Pacific Highway and Coutts. Mr. Miller and Mr. Madden credited DLT's work for the successful resolution of those blockades.

Emerson, Manitoba

Mr. Miller explained that RCMP promptly resolved the Emerson blockade, due in part to its community-based policing approach. Mr. Miller stated that the protestors who established the blockade were from local communities, and that the RCMP sergeant on scene was familiar with many of them. The sergeant performed a DLT-like function by liaising directly with protestors to encourage dialogue and maintain a peaceful atmosphere. He informed them that they were blockading a major highway, and ultimately convinced them to leave. Mr. Miller explained that extreme cold weather and a winter storm may also have helped convince protestors to leave. The RCMP Detachment Commander at Emerson decided to permit protestors to parade around Emerson and then depart without being arrested or charged.

Mr. Miller and Mr. Madden characterized RCMP's response to the Emerson blockade as extremely successful. They attributed this success to the fact that RCMP was the police of jurisdiction and had clear authority to manage the incident. Mr. Miller noted that RCMP was able to rapidly mobilize specialized units to respond to the incident without going through a multi-agency resourcing process, and also had additional resources on standby which ultimately were not needed.

Coutts, Alberta

Mr. Miller and Mr. Madden characterized RCMP's response to the Coutts border blockade as extremely successful. Mr. Miller understood that the Coutts protestors initially intended to conduct a lawful protest, but he observed that the event soon became a blockade. He stated that at that point RCMP ramped up by establishing a mobile command post, bringing in DLT to negotiate with protestors, and assembling tactical units and a specialized public order unit called Special Tactics and Operations that specializes in policing protests that have cemented themselves. He explained that DLT learned that 5-10% of the protestors formed a rogue group within the broader protestor group, and that the leader of that broader group informed DLT that he did not know who the rogue protestors were, why they were attending the protest, or what their intentions were. As the blockade progressed, he stated that RCMP received intelligence that members of the rogue group had a stash of firearms and were planning to shoot any RCMP officers who attempted to clear the blockade. He stated that RCMP successfully resolved the situation

Pacific/North Region Board Director Trevor Dinwoodie provided information on the response to the Pacific Highway blockade.



by executing a search warrant to seize the firearms and arresting the rogue protestors on February 14, and that the broader group of protestors subsequently left on February 15.

Mr. Madden attributed the swift resolution of the Coutts blockade after the February 14 arrests to the fact that RCMP was in control of the situation as the police of jurisdiction. The RCMP had additional resources on standby, including specialized units, which ultimately were not needed.

Pacific Highway, British Columbia

Mr. Madden characterized RCMP's response to the Pacific Highway blockade as successful. RCMP was the police of jurisdiction in British Columbia and maintained a detachment in Surrey where the Pacific Highway port of entry is located. Mr. Madden stated that starting on February 5, a group of protestors began to conduct a lawful protest near the Pacific Highway that did not block access to the border. He explained that on February 12, additional protestors, including a large convoy from Abbotsford, arrived at the Pacific Highway. Several RCMP members attended the protest site to gather intelligence and determined that the numbers of protestors were increasing and that there were pockets of disruptive and belligerent behaviour. Mr. Madden stated that there was tension between the Abbotsford convoy and the initial group of protestors, including because members of the Abbotsford convoy were very aggressive and uttered racial slurs that offended other protestors and raised public safety concerns.

Mr. Madden explained that, after observing disruptive and belligerent behaviour on the morning of February 12, the several RCMP members at the protest site requested additional resources from the Surrey detachment. That detachment dispatched 10 additional officers and a supervisor to the scene. The supervisor determined that the protestor group would increase in size and brought in DLT, which in turn brought in specialized public order units upon arriving. 72 hours later, DLT gave the protestors a final warning to disperse and public order units dispersed the protestors with minimal arrests and violence.

RCMP Access to Towing Resources

Mr. Miller explained that RCMP does not own towing equipment but does have a list of towing companies that RCMP regularly uses to tow vehicles. He stated that RCMP reached out to towing companies to assist, but that they were reluctant to get involved because they received threats and they were concerned that assisting police would jeopardize their business with truckers. He noted that one or two tow truck companies did begin to assist RCMP, but that these companies subsequently ceased to assist after receiving death threats and threats that truckers would cease to do business with them.

Mr. Miller explained that he had been told that RCMP considered obtaining towing capacity from the Department of National Defence, but that this option was determined to not be viable because the federal government is generally unwilling to use military assets to perform policing-related tasks. He also stated that RCMP's K division explored using RCMP officers with truck driving licences to drive tow trucks.



Impact of Federal Emergency Declaration

Mr. Miller discussed the impact of the federal government's February 14 declaration of a public order emergency under the *Emergencies Act* on RCMP's command role authority in Ottawa. He stated that the powers granted under the *Emergencies Act* were not necessary for the RCMP to take command of the response to the Ottawa protests or empower RCMP to enforce provincial or local laws. He explained that RCMP officers sent to Ottawa were still sworn in as OPS special constables after the federal emergency declaration.

Mr. Miller stated that the power granted under the *Emergencies Act* to compel tow truck companies to assist police protected those companies and their drivers from being blamed by protestors and protestor sympathizers for assisting police.

Recommendations for the Future

On behalf of the NPF, Mr. Madden and Mr. Miller made three recommendations to improve the policing of major events and protests in the National Capital Region:

- (1) The *Police Services Act* should be amended to extend full policing authority to the RCMP in the event of a declared emergency in Ontario;
- (2) RCMP should assume responsibility for security and policing in and around Parliament Hill; and
- (3) RCMP should be the lead agency for police planning for and response to any major event or protest near Parliament Hill.

Regarding recommendation 1, Mr. Madden stated that such an amendment would be a major step forward because it would permit the rapid deployment of RCMP's many Ontario officers in a crisis, without the need to summarily swear them in as provincial or municipal special constables.

In recommendation 2, Mr. Madden and Mr. Miller suggested that RCMP should assume PPS's responsibilities for security on Parliament Hill and absorb PPS into RCMP. Mr. Miller explained that PPS officers were "lost bodies" during the Freedom Convoy because they lacked policing authorities outside of the fence surrounding Parliament Hill and lacked the appropriate training to engage in policing tasks. OPS and RCMP were accordingly unable to use PPS as a resource. Mr. Miller and Mr. Madden explained that absorbing PPS into RCMP would ensure that RCMP officers responsible for policing and security on Parliament Hill would have the training and authorities to assist with policing tasks outside the fence surrounding Parliament Hill in the event of a major protest in the future.

Mr. Madden and Mr. Miller also advanced recommendation 3: that RCMP should be the lead police agency planning for and the response to any major protest near Parliament Hill. They made this recommendation for several reasons:



- First, they stated that RCMP has greater experience than any other service in the country with policing major events and has the specialized resources and equipment required to police those events. They emphasized RCMP's experience securing major events such as international summits, Olympic events, or visits from persons of note (such as the Pope), and the specialized units RCMP employs such as bomb disposal teams, emergency response teams, liaison officers, and drone units, etc.
- Second, they explained that RCMP can quickly identify resource needs and surge resources from its 20,000-strong national membership to the National Capital Region. They emphasized that in a RCMP-led event, resource needs could be promptly identified by the National Division commander, requested through Commissioner Lucki from other RCMP divisions, and deployed to Ottawa.
 - They observed that placing RCMP in the lead role would: (1) eliminate delays caused by filtering resource requests through other police agencies and levels of government to RCMP, and (2) reduce frictions and disputes that flow from attempting to place resources from RCMP under an OPS-led command structure.
- Third, they explained that a greater RCMP role would integrate RCMP's frontline and protective policing functions. They observed that RCMP can perform both tasks, and Parliamentarians are already comfortable with RCMP's protective policing role.